By Rasim Koç
Published by the Middle East Policy Council, December 17, 2024.
Syrian rebels have taken control of Syria after sweeping through major cities like Aleppo, Hama, and Homs within 13 days. The swift collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government marks a turning point for Syria and a devastating blow to Iran and Russia, the regime’s best allies. With Assad now in exile in Russia, decades of Moscow’s military and political investments in Syria are at risk, a setback for President Vladimir Putin’s regional ambitions.
This essay explores three questions:
1-What is the role of geography in the instability of Syria
2-How did Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) transform itself, ideologically and militarily, in the safe zone of Idlib, and who played key roles in arming and training it?
3-What is the relationship between Turkey and HTS, and how will others in the region react to this transformation?
The answers will help us understand whether HTS can endure or if Syria will succumb to a cycle of chaos and coups.
Geography as Destiny
Syria’s historical and contemporary struggles highlight the interplay among its fragmented geography, diverse population, and enduring political instability. The recent victory of the HTS in the Syrian civil war may appear to herald a new era. However, geographic and demographic realities suggest that the conflict’s conclusion marks only the end of one chapter and the beginning of another.
Lacking significant natural barriers, Syria is vulnerable both externally and internally. Its borders, largely artificial creations of colonial powers, fail to align with natural defenses or cohesive national identities. Internally, the country is divided into distinct regions: the oasis of Damascus in the southwest, the commercial gateway of Aleppo in the north, the narrow coastal strip along the Mediterranean, the rugged southern plateau, the Homs-Hama corridor, and the expansive, barren lands of the Euphrates Valley in the east. Each region functions as a distinct political, economic, and social entity.
Damascus, historically isolated and militarized, has struggled to assert control over the resourceful and strategically located Aleppo. The Mediterranean coastline has long served as a haven for minority groups and a conduit for foreign alliances, while the Euphrates Valley ties Syria to the broader dynamics of Mesopotamia. These divisions have left Damascus perpetually vulnerable, necessitating centralized, often repressive, governance to maintain fragile unity.
Following its independence, Syria experienced political fragility, underscored by defeats in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the collapse of the United Arab Republic with Egypt. These failures deepened Syria’s reliance on radical ideologies such as Pan-Arabism, which flourished under Hafez al-Assad’s Baathist regime. While authoritarian rule brought a semblance of stability, it did so by suppressing dissent and sidelining democratic processes.
In 2011, the Arab Spring brought Syria’s latent tensions to the surface, sparking a civil war fueled by foreign-backed militias and exacerbated by state violence. Geography once again shaped the conflict. The Islamic State seized control of Raqqa and Mosul in the Euphrates Valley, while Assad’s regime clung to the Mediterranean coast with support from Russia. The Homs-Hama corridor, a critical artery connecting Damascus and Aleppo, became the war’s decisive battleground. Control of this strategic area determined the first phase of the conflict, with Assad and his allies emerging victorious.
Syria’s lack of natural unity, exacerbated by its artificial borders and diverse population, continues to undermine efforts at state-building. The absence of a strong national identity has left the country vulnerable to external interference and internal division. Throughout its history, Syria has relied on repressive governance and foreign alliances to stave off collapse.
Idlib as the Womb of HTS
Idlib’s transformation into a stronghold for HTS is rooted in its unique sociological and demographic characteristics, coupled with geopolitical developments. Idlib, historically an agrarian and relatively impoverished region, became the epicenter of displacement and radicalization during Syria’s civil war. Several factors contributed to this transformation. The Assad regime’s military campaigns and subsequent population transfers altered the province’s demographics. It became a refuge for displaced Syrians, particularly Sunni Muslims, creating a homogenous socioreligious composition conducive to the growth of Islamist movements. Idlib’s population swelled with individuals and families who shared grievances against the regime, intensifying anti-government sentiments. These persecuted and expelled groups developed a territorially shaped Syrian nationalism mixed with Islam.
Idlib’s pre-war society was predominantly rural and tribal, with limited state infrastructure and weak institutions. The conflict exacerbated these vulnerabilities, fragmenting local communities and paving the way for militant groups to fill the governance vacuum. HTS capitalized on this by offering services, security, and an ideological framework that resonated with disenfranchised locals. Islam became the most effective glue for Idlib’s diverse population.
Idlib’s location near the Turkish border allowed it to remain semi-insulated from regime offensives, turning it into a de facto sanctuary for opposition forces. Turkey’s control over the region allowed the flow of resources and personnel that enabled HTS to consolidate its influence. The proximity to Turkey also helped HTS to maintain supply lines and logistical support crucial for its operations. The group also benefited from the Islamism of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government.
The economic devastation in Idlib, compounded by the war, created fertile ground for the reconstruction of a nationalist Islamism. HTS exploited the desperation of marginalized communities, embedding its ideological narratives into the social fabric while it provided basic services and economic relief.
Through these sociological and demographic dynamics, Idlib evolved into both a haven and a launching pad for HTS, becoming central to the group’s operations and governance model.
The Transformation of HTS into a Nationalist Islamic Group
HTS’s evolution from a jihadist organization with global aspirations to a more moderate, Syria-focused entity is a result of pragmatic adaptation to local and international pressures. The group underwent a calculated rebranding process, distancing itself from its roots in al-Qaeda and transnational jihadism. This was symbolized by the group’s name change from Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This was aimed at presenting HTS as a legitimate force for nationalist Islamism, concerned solely with Syria’s future, rather than a global terror network. Discussion groups focused on the freedom of Syria as a state rather than the entire Arab or Islamic world. Members learned from the mistakes of the past and were regularly reminded by the Turks that their focus should be re-establishing a modern, democratic republic in Syria.
The emergence of this Idlib-based Islamism (also called Shami Salafism) marks a significant ideological shift within the broader Salafi landscape. Unlike the Saudi-rooted Nejdi Salafism, which emphasizes strict adherence to Wahhabi doctrine, Shami Salafism is a nationalist interpretation influenced by reformist Islamic scholars such as Ali al-Tantawi (1909–1999) and Issam al-Attar (1927–2024).1 This ideology gained traction among Islamist groups in Idlib, including HTS. They stress pragmatism in rebuilding the country rather than adherence to religious dogma. Key characteristics of this Shami Salafism are
- its proximity to Sufi traditions
- its embrace of modern economic and technological systems
- its recognition of ethnoreligious diversity
- and its embrace of democratic and constitutional systems.
While it cannot be reduced to any single source, this synthesis has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. Idlibi Islamism rejects extreme interpretations of the Quran and hadith, including a restrained approach to hudoud (corporal punishment) and banning outright practices like beheadings, commonly associated with groups like the Islamic State.
HTS leader Ahmad al-Shara, known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, is more concerned with consolidating power than adhering to an ideological framework. On the basis of my interviews with Syrians from Idlib, I believe Julani is earnest in his professed aspiration to create a nationalized version of HTS, distinct from the transnational jihadist vision. His concern is Syria and rebuilding the country. This evolution underscores the nationalized nature of Idlibi Islamism, shaped as much by political pragmatism as by theology. It is also informed by the Turkish experience under Erdoğan, as many Syrian Islamists respect him.
The commune of Idlib is the key to understanding the transformation of HTS. When it controlled the province, Syria’s new revolutionary leadership prioritized establishing governance structures such as the Salvation Government to manage civil affairs, deliver services, and administer justice. By addressing local needs, HTS fostered a perception of stability and order. This helped the group gain support from Syrians who opposed both the Assad regime and the radical Islamist factions. During my two visits to the area and my interviews with the locals, I realized the profound impact that the Baath regime had on the way people define themselves: as Syrian and as understanding the nation-state as their homeland (watan).
HTS shifted its military strategy to align with its localized vision. It ceased attacks on international targets and focused its resources on defending Idlib against the Assad regime and its allies. This strategic recalibration aimed to consolidate its position as a protector of the Syrian opposition. And by adopting nationalist Islamism, HTS appealed to a broader base within Syria, including secular and moderate Islamist factions, while minimizing alienation from regional stakeholders like Turkey.
Turkey as a Kingmaker
HTS recognized the need to adapt to regional and international realities. Turkey, a key player in Idlib, exerted pressure on the group to moderate and avoid being labeled a terrorist organization—as well as to align with Turkish objectives in Syria. This included reducing overtly radical rhetoric and focusing on domestic rather than transnational goals.
The swift collapse of the Assad regime and the subsequent rise of Syrian rebels thus highlights Turkey’s strategic maneuvering and growing influence. Turkey’s support for HTS has allowed Ankara to emerge as the dominant external power in the country. While the successful rebellion has been celebrated by many, particularly in the West, this outcome also introduces significant concerns for key regional players, such as Iran and Israel.
For Iran, the loss of Syria represents a devastating blow to its regional strategy and prestige. IT undermines Tehran’s ability to counterbalance the United States and Israel and diminishes its influence in the Levant. However, more concerning is Turkey’s rise as a formidable rival.2 Ankara’s growing regional clout is further evidenced by its decisive support for Azerbaijan in reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia in 2023.
Ironically, while Israel welcomed the removal of Iran’s presence in Syria, it too faces challenges from Turkey’s newfound influence. An HTS-led government in Damascus, backed by Ankara, poses a potential threat to Israel’s security and regional strategy. Unlike the Assad regime, which had maintained a degree of pragmatism, HTS is likely to reject Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights and adopt a more aggressive stance to restore its sovereignty. The new rulers’ ties to Palestinian groups, which could be even stronger than Shiite Iran’s, could also present a challenge for Tel Aviv. The Netanyahu government likely sees a Turkey-aligned Syria becoming unpredictable and possibly hostile.
The Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, share additional reasons for concern. Having invested heavily in dismantling the Arab Spring movements and supporting counterrevolutions, including the military coup in Egypt, these states view Turkey’s backing of HTS and its broader ideological alignment with political Islam as a direct challenge to their efforts. They fear this success in Syria will embolden similar movements and potentially destabilize Gulf monarchies. Further, Turkey’s alignment with Qatar, a rival to the Saudi-led Gulf bloc, has exacerbated tensions by positioning Ankara as a competing power center in the Sunni Arab world.
Russia, too, has been significantly impacted. Once a dominant player, Moscow has seen its influence eroded by Turkey’s strategic maneuvers. In 2015, with Assad’s forces controlling just 20 percent of Syria, Russia launched a military operation to stabilize the regime. Within two years, Russia had helped negotiate temporary ceasefires and eventually allowed Assad to regain territory. Syria’s strategic significance to Russia, including the Tartus naval base and Khmeimim air base, supported its broader military operations in Libya, the Sahel, and beyond.
Even as its priorities shifted following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moscow maintained its presence in Syria. However, its robust military and political backing for Assad gave way as the Syrian civil war reignited. As the rebels advanced, government forces largely stepped aside and their external backers failed to intervene decisively. Preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, Russia intensified airstrikes in Idlib but refrained from reinforcing Assad’s crumbling position. Faced with diminishing resources and shifting priorities, Putin appears to have chosen to cut the regime loose and focus instead on preserving Russia’s military foothold in a post-Assad Syria. Although Moscow is likely to pursue diplomatic efforts to retain its foothold, the shift in rhetoric from referring to Syrian rebels as “terrorists” to “armed opposition” suggests a recalibration.
Still, these losses will impact Russia’s relationships with regional powers like Israel and Turkey. Tel Aviv, which previously had to coordinate with Moscow when conducting strikes against Iranian proxies in Syria, now has greater freedom to maneuver. For Ankara, Assad’s ouster enhances its leverage over Russia.
Having supported the rebel forces, Turkey is now positioned to shape the post-Assad future and consolidate its dominance in the region. It can also potentially repatriate millions of refugees.
But this high-stakes gamble comes with significant risks for Erdoğan. The HTS-led coalition has an unproven track record. If its governance fails to address Syria’s deep-seated issues—economic devastation, sectarian divides, and infrastructure collapse—instability could return. Moreover, the resurgence of extremist groups like ISIS poses a threat to Turkey, given its vulnerability to cross-border terrorism and jihadist networks. Turkey also bears some of the burden of stabilization. The international community’s willingness to invest in Syria will depend on the HTS-led government’s ability to meet demands for inclusivity and reform. Failure could isolate Syria, exacerbate its internal chaos, and force Turkey to contend with renewed refugee flows and heightened insecurity along its border.
Conclusion
The fall of Assad’s regime marks a pivotal moment in the modern history of Syria and the broader Middle East, presenting both opportunities and profound challenges. This new chapter, driven by the ascendancy of Turkey-backed HTS, offers the possibility of a reimagined Syrian state. However, the fragile nature of the new ruling coalition, the complexity of Syria’s geographic and social fabric, and the competing interests of regional and global actors ensure that the future remains uncertain.
While Turkey has emerged as a dominant power in shaping post-Assad Syria, this influence comes with immense responsibility. The HTS-led government must prove its ability to govern inclusively, address Syria’s economic and social devastation, and prevent the resurgence of extremist threats like ISIS. Failure to meet these expectations could unravel the fragile stability and reignite conflict, undermining the gains made by Turkey and the broader opposition.
Regionally, the new dynamics will likely reshape alliances and power structures. Turkey’s strengthened position challenges Iran’s influence, unsettles Gulf monarchies, and raises concerns in Israel. Meanwhile, Russia’s retreat signals a recalibration of its strategic priorities, reflecting its vulnerabilities and shifting global focus.
For Syria, this is a critical opportunity to rebuild and redefine its national identity, but the path forward is fraught. The region and the international community must engage constructively to support stability and development while holding the new leadership accountable. As Syria begins this new chapter, the hope for a brighter future is tempered by the persistent shadows of its past and the formidable challenges that lie ahead.
Footnotes
1 Al-Attar also authored several books, including: Our Islamic Country and the Power Struggle; Spiritual Crisis; Islam’s View on Alliance with the West; Faith and its Impact on Individual and Social Upbringing; Words; Revolution of Truth; Remnants of Days; and Departure.
2 Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed the toppling of Syrian President Bashar Assad was a result of a “joint U.S.-Israeli plot,” saying that “a government in a neighboring country of Syria has played and is still playing a clear role in what’s happening,” in an apparent reference to Turkey.
Dr. Koç, Kent University in Istanbul, is an instructor at the Police Academy in Istanbul and works on Turkish foreign and security policies.
