Assistant Professor at The Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS) at Khalifa University
relevant publications
Source: Legislating Reality and Politicizing History: Contextualizing Armenian Claims of Genocide, Manzara Verlag, 2016.
"This book does not classify what happened to
Ottoman Armenians as genocide. This is because the term does not apply to the
horrific massacres, slaughters, injustices and murders of 1915. This is an
uncomfortable position to take and one that is unpopular in places ranging from
Los Angeles to Paris to Beirut. Though the events of 1915 are not, and indeed
(legally) cannot be referred to as genocide, this book does not shy away from
the need to describe, fully acknowledge and therefore, in some way honor all of
the victims (Muslims and Christians) who suffered unspeakable horrors, shame,
disgrace, and injustice in 1915." Pp. 7 and 8
"Importantly, the vast majority of scholars who dispute the Armenian Genocide narrative do not dispute the tragedy and deaths that
occurred beginning in 1915. It is the number of deaths and the circumstances
surrounding the murders, massacres and deportations that are in question." Pp. 32-33
"This
book posits that Armenian diaspora communities, in large part, rely on and gain
sustenance from the traumatic events of 1915 because these tragic events
provide the only glue that bonds disparate linguistic, religious and
geographically atomized communities. Thus, the common perception of the
Armenian diaspora as a cohesive force speaking with a unified voice quickly
falls apart when issues are broached outside the purview of the campaign for
Armenian Genocide recognition. Though views of how genocide recognition should
be achieved and what should come afterward vary, little dissent exists or is
tolerated – at least publicly – within the diaspora. This is particularly true
in regards to relations between individual ethnic Armenians and ethnic Turks,
regardless of their citizenship. Because contact is discouraged and, very
likely, unwanted by the diaspora, relations between the two groups at almost
every level remain non-existent outside of Turkey and, importantly, the
Republic of Armenia." P. 21
"Because
recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide only adversely affects outsiders
(Turks), and correspondingly ‘helps' insiders (Armenian-Americans for example),
many unquestioningly support such ad hoc
legislative moves. It should be pointed out, however, that many of these same
supporters become squeamish when issues such as reparations for slavery or
colonial excesses are raised. These issues are closer to home, so to speak, and
therefore the historical record and accompanying narratives appear more
complicated, involved and potentially expensive." Pp. 5 and 6
The
historical record of the Caucasus and Anatolia demonstrates that Armenians and
Turks are not age-old enemies. Neither are the Armenians the enemy of Muslim
peoples inhabiting the region, such as the Kurds, Persians, Chechens, Laz, and
others." P. 25
"From
its earliest beginnings, but particularly after the conquest of Istanbul
(Constantinople) in 1453, Armenians played important roles in the Ottoman
government, trade and manufacturing and were often described as the most loyal
community in the Empire by Ottoman court historians. Armenians and Muslims
rarely suffered effects of inter-communal violence until well into the
nineteenth century. When conflict arrived, it did so largely because of the
advent and wide dissemination of outside ideas, the promulgation of a new
Ottoman constitution that was favorable to minority communities in the Empire
and the increasingly forceful meddling in Ottoman affairs by foreign powers." P.26
"Recognition
of these events as an Armenian Genocide constitutes the first step towards the
end goals of recognition: indemnity payments and right of return of property
and land in Turkey." Pp. 33-34
"Although
the constitution of the Republic of Armenia makes explicit reference to the
events of 1915 as the Armenian Genocide, thus furthering the diaspora's goal of
worldwide genocide recognition, many Armenians in Armenia and Turkey have grave misgivings regarding the semantics employed
by the diaspora and their allies in Armenia's governments over the years.
Specifically, the act of genocide recognition, though highly symbolic, is also
legal in nature and carries with it the possibility of reparations to and the
return of survivors to lands and properties lost in events deemed genocidal in
nature. Furthermore, a serious rapprochement between the Republic of Armenia
and Turkey is unthinkable, whilst the campaign's demands for reparation, return
of territory and properties continue." Pp.
34-35
"The
trauma that was 1915 for Armenians is now the
bond that unites worldwide Armenian diaspora communities. Their holy grail,
constituted as the goal of genocide recognition, constantly disputed and
thwarted by the Ottoman Empire's successor state Turkey, continues to stoke the
flames of mistrust, hurt and antipathy that constitute diaspora identity." P. 36
"The
Armenian diaspora – viewing the power of the Nazi Holocaust narrative of
victimhood, victim nation and survival and the outpouring of monetary and
strategic resources it has brought Israel – specifically tailors its campaign
for Armenian Genocide recognition based on a specific argument: the incidents
of ethnic cleansing, deportation, exile and massacres that befell Ottoman
Armenians in 1915 were the precursor
to the Nazi Holocaust. In other words, the events of 1915 constituted the
template or blueprint containing the instructions, means and methods that were
later used by the Nazis in their attempted extermination of European Jews.
According to this interesting yet unsubstantiated narrative, the Nazi Holocaust
would not, indeed could not have occurred without being first informed by the
events of 1915. The connecting of two disparate tragedies that occurred within
25 years of one another is significant in that it demonstrates the willful
ignorance and blatant politicization of the Armenian campaign for genocide
recognition. The two events were unconnected." Pp. 56-57
"In
stark contrast to the premeditated, proactive and exhaustively planned and
executed capture, deportation and extermination of Europe's Jews, the
deportation of Ottoman Armenians was performed as part of a reactive strategy
on the part of the Ottoman government in the face of massive insurrections and
almost certain defeat during World War I." P. 62
"The
slaughter and exile of Armenians of Eastern Anatolia occurred against the
backdrop of a cataclysmic world war and the mutual massacres that accompanied
it as multiple empires collapsed. To ignore this as well as the fundamental
impact of Great Power policies vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, particularly those
of Russia, France, and Great Britain, is tantamount to divorcing the events
from the contextual history of which they were part. The retreat of the Ottoman
Empire over the previous two centuries, the ethnic cleansing of Muslims and the
mass influx of Muslim refugees from the Crimea, Balkans, and elsewhere, as well
as the Balkan Wars are of extreme importance in understanding the context in
which the expulsion and murder of Armenians occurred." Pp. 138 and 139
"As
ideas of nationalism, self-determination and the example of homogeneous
nation-states spread, they were accompanied by waves of forced migrations made
by displaced Muslims from former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Crimea,
Transcaucasia and elsewhere. These Muslim refugees fled to the shrinking
Ottoman Empire. Many were not so lucky. From 1864 until 1912-13, several
million Ottoman Muslims, mostly Turks, were massacred or died as victims of
ethnic cleansing in former Ottoman territories. When the Ottomans lost Crete in
1897, much of the Muslim population, which is estimated to have constituted
forty-five percent of the population, was forced to leave." Pp. 164 and 165
"It
was Russian policy to destabilize and dismember the Ottoman Empire. One of the
ways Russia implemented this policy was to not only allow, but encourage the
Dashnaks and Hunchaks to organize and mobilize in order to foment armed attacks
in the Ottoman Empire using both Russia and Russian-controlled Transcaucasia as
a springboard." P. 171.
"Both
the Hunchaks and Dashnaks advocated and carried out armed struggles, other
forms of violence and assassinations to achieve their aims. However, they were
split along theoretical lines regarding the actual form Armenian independence
should take. The Hunchaks demanded a fully independent Armenia. Dashnaks opted
for the vaguer notion of what they termed ‘free Armenia.' This is important because
these apparently minor divisions, as distilled over time, continued to inform,
shape and galvanize Armenian diaspora identity. However, these ideological
lines blurred when it came to confronting the Ottoman state. Members of both
groups attacked Ottoman army units, posts, Kurdish villages and executed ethnic
Armenians who cooperated with the Ottoman state. In these acts, the Dashnaks
and Hunchaks often acted in concert with one another." P. 173.
"The
tense situation in eastern Anatolia in the mid-1890s was a result of a number
of factors: continued Armenian revolutionary violence and the often-violent
Ottoman responses; the overall weakness of the Ottoman state; multiple refugee
crises that resulted in the resettlement to eastern and southern Anatolia of
uprooted, impoverished and traumatized Muslims from the Balkans, Crete and
Transcaucasia; the raids and slaughter of Armenians by nomadic, Kurdish tribes
in eastern and southern Anatolia; and the lack of overt European support –
military or otherwise – for an independent Armenia." P. 177.
"The
provocations, assassinations, murder of Ottoman Muslims and sabotage performed
by Armenian revolutionaries were coldly calculated to provoke the reactive slaughter
and murder of fellow Armenians for the consumption of Europeans and Russians
via lurid press articles informed by knee-jerk sympathies for Christians and
racist views of Turks, in particular, and Muslims, in general." P. 179.
"By
underlining the highly complex and volatile situation that existed in the
Ottoman Empire, but particularly in eastern and southern Anatolia, this book
calls attention to the plight and horrific demise of many innocents, both
Muslim and Christian. It also underscores the direct links between the
often-violent actions of Armenian revolutionaries and the reactive, Ottoman
massacres that ensued in the 1890s. These purposefully provocative, often
murderous Armenian actions and the reactions they provoked represent a
startling prelude of what was to befall the Empire and many of its Armenian
citizens in 1915." P. 179.
"What
is not debated by most scholars and, importantly, what is not questioned in
this book, is the fact that the vast majority of Ottoman Armenians were gone
from Anatolia at the end of World War I in 1918 and the subsequent nationalist
struggles that followed into 1922. Rather, it is the questions of how, when,
how many and under what circumstances these vibrant, centuries-old Armenian
communities disappeared – men, women, and children – that are subject to such
relentless and mordacious debates." P.
198.
"The
reactions by…Turkish governments to veiled or overt claims that involve
reparations and territory can be characterized as vehement, even paranoid. This
is in large part because Turkey's own traumatic relationship with the events of
1915, the Treaty of Sevres, and the corresponding, deep-seated fear of
territorial loss the Treaty spawned. Indeed, the Turkish government's stance
vis-à-vis the campaign for Armenian Genocide recognition and that of Turkish
public opinion mirror the development of their own large group identity in
relation to the Ottoman Empire and the massive trauma that accompanied its
demise." P. 277
"Indeed,
the issue of borders rather than the Armenian claims of genocide are perhaps
the biggest obstacle in the normalization of ties between Turkey and Armenia." P. 285
"For
diaspora Armenians, Armenia is more of an idea rather than a country full of
living, breathing people. This is not to imply that diaspora Armenians do not
care deeply about Armenians and the Republic of Armenia, to include the
disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the near-century of Armenia's
isolation under Soviet rule as well as time and space have led to a diaspora
construction of what the Republic of Armenia and its inhabitants should be,
rather than what or who they really are. The disparate identities that emerged
between diaspora communities and their counterparts in Eastern Armenia have, in
some cases, led to confusion and an emphasis on very different goals. Indeed,
the diaspora's attempts to influence events based on its ‘imagined' Armenia
have had interesting consequences for the Republic of Armenia, its inhabitants
and its future." P. 296
"Simply
put, the campaign for Armenian Genocide recognition is historically inaccurate
because it is based on ideological representations of events that occurred over
one century ago. These ideological representations are then packaged in a
highly politicized manner for political purposes." Pp. 335-336
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